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The article presents the manner in which the phenomenon of compoundhood 
was analysed and interpreted in the most representative texts of Greek linguistic 
thought, that is in Aristotle’s writings, in Tekhne grammatike attributed to Dio­
nysius Thrax and in Apollonius Dyscolus’ treatise On Syntax. Comparison of the 
appropriate passages from those works leads to the conclusion that each presents 
or discusses the phenomenon in question in the context of a different set of issues 
it raises. Thus, Aristotle examines compoundhood primarily from the point of view 
of its potential influence on the functional semantics of names, which is mainly 
perceived in logical terms. Tekhne grammatike in turn concentrates on the prob­
lem of locating compoundhood within the structure of grammatical properties of 
words and determining in this way its relation to other derivational and inflection­
al properties. Finally, Apollonius Dyscolus attempts to point out the criteria that 
make it possible to distinguish compoundhood from syntactic complexity, which 
is related to the necessity of establishing the fundamental definitional properties 
of the word as a linguistic unit opposed to the phrase. In this way compoundhood 
found its way into Greek linguistics as a phenomenon analysed from the point of 
view of problems it may pose in the areas of semantics, morphology and syntax. 
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Ihe phenomenon of compounds as well as the problem of the derivation of words 
was present in the ancient Greek reflection on language basically since its very 
beginnings. Speculations about the word-formation motivations of words, which 
were frequently fanciful and based merely on the similarity of the phonetic shape 
of the compared words, were conducted initially in the context of the particular 
beliefs about the connections between language and extralinguistic reality, and 
thus also in the context of the philosophical controversy about the nature of 
language (i.e. whether it is natural or conventional). This, in turn, was related to 
the debate on the epistemological value of word-formation (derivational) analyses 
(i.e. the ancient etymologies) as tools which enable one to establish the essence 
of things that are denoted by the particular words. In the subsequent period the 
consideration of linguistic questions attained a certain kind of autonomy, at least 
in certain circles, which resulted in considerable progress in the identification of 
the crucial properties of language as such, as well as of words which were products 
of the process of composition. At the same time it is interesting to explore the 
differences which may be observed in the way the composita were analysed and 
interpreted in the particular texts which constitute the ancient Greek linguistic 
tradition. In order to illustrate these differences we will first make reference to 
the appropriate passages in Aristotle’s works, then to the Art of Grammar which 
is ascribed to Dionysius Thrax, and finally to the treatise On Syntax by Apollo­
nius Dyscolus.
Although Aristotle did not belong to the group of ancient grammarians and 
he did not devote any separate treatise to language, he did engage in linguistic 
questions in many of his writings whenever his subject called for this, and his 
influence upon the subsequent development of Greek (and European) linguistics 
was great. Ihe problems concerning compounds were referred to by the Philos­
opher in the Poetics and in the Hermeneutics. In the first of these treatises such 
a reference is made first in Chapter 20 when the author defines the onoma (‘noun’) 
as one of the components of language. We read there the following words:
Aristotelis Poetica, 1457al0-14:
Όνομα δέ έστι φωνή σύνθετή σημαντική άνευ χρόνου, ής μέρος ούδέν έστι 
καθ’ αύτό σημαντικόν· έν γάρ τοΐς διπλοΐς ού χρώμεθα ώς και αυτό καθ' αυτό 
σημαίνον, οίον έν τώ Θεόδωρος τό δωρος ού σημαίνει.
A noun is a compound, significant, nontemporal sound, no part of which is in­
dependently significant; for in double nouns we do not employ any part as inde­
pendently significant: e.g. in Theodorusthe -dorus part has no meaning.1 
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As we can see, one of the defining properties of the noun, apart from semanticity 
and the lack of the designation of time,1 2 is its semantic indivisibility. This property 
is so special or unobvious that its validity is supported by additional argumenta­
tion which refers to the asemanticity of the part of the noun referred to as onoma 
diploun (δνομα διπλούν). The exemplification that is alluded to attests that this 
onoma diploun is a two-part compound, i. e. Theodores (Θεόδωρος), in which the 
component -doros is claimed not to have any meaning (oil σημαίνει). It seems that 
a kind of justification of this statement results from the fact that the aforementioned 
noun (Theodoros) is an anthroponym, a conventional male name whose purpose 
is merely to identify the people who bear it. However, due to the emphasised 
asemanticity of the parts of all nouns as such we may conclude that the basis 
for the distinguishing of compound nouns (onomata dipla) must be connected 
with the semanticity of their parts which realises itself outside those nouns, i.e. 
when the parts function as separate words (doron - ‘a gift’)·3
1 All passages from the Poetics are quoted according to the edition and translation by 
St. Halliwell in: Henderson (1995).
2 This lack of (co-)designation of time constitutes a property which distinguishes in 
a definitional manner the onoma (the noun) from the rhema (the verb); cf. 1457314-15: 
ρήμα δέ φωνή σύνθετή σημαντική μετά χρόνου, ής ούδέν μέρος σημαίνει καθ' αύτό, ώσπερ 
καί έπί των ονομάτων - “A verb is a compound, significant sound with a temporal 
force, but no part of which is independently significant (as with nouns)”. Let us add, 
that the expression “compund sound” (φωνή συνθέτη), used also in reference to onoma, 
means here that the verb (and the noun) is (as a sound) composed of phones (στοιχεία) 
and syllables (συλλαβαί).
3 For a thorough examination of the linguistic content of the 20th chapter of the Poetics 
see Swiggers, Wouters (2002).
At the beginning of Chapter 21 Aristotle returns to the description of nouns 
by providing a more comprehensive typology:
Aristotelis Poetica, 1457a30-36:
Ονόματος δέ εϊδη τό μέν άπλοϋν, άπλοϋν δέ λέγω δ μή έκ σημαινόντων σύγκειται, 
olov γη, τό δέ διπλούν- τούτου δέ τό μέν έκ σημαίνοντος καί άσημου, πλήν ούκ 
έν τώ όνόματι σημαίνοντος καί άσήμου, τό δέ έκ σημαινόντων σύγκειται. Εϊη δ’ 
άν καί τριπλουν καί τετραπλούν όνομα καί πολλαπλούν, οίον τά πολλά των 
Μασσαλιωτών, Έρμοκαϊκόξανθος.
Nouns can be classed as ‘single’ (by which I mean those not comprising significant 
parts, e.g. ge [‘earth’]) and ‘double’. The latter can be subdivided into those formed 
from both significant and nonsignificant parts (though this is not their function 
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within the noun), and those comprising only significant parts. One could further 
distinguish ‘triple’, ‘quadruple’ and ‘polysyllabic’ nouns, e.g. most Massaliote 
terms: Hermocaicoxanthus.“
Thus, the onoma diploun, which was distinguished in the preceding passage, is con­
fronted here with the onoma haploun (όνομα άπλούν). Moreover, the Stagirite also 
distinguishes the onoma triploun, tetraploun and pollaploun. The description of 
the onoma diploun, which is included in the cited passage, enables us to identify it 
- similarly as in the passage quoted earlier - with a compound founded upon 
two word-formation bases, but perhaps also with a simple suffixal derivative, 
if we should identify its component which was referred to as asemos (άσημος - 
‘nonsignificant’) with a suffix. Thereby the term onoma haploun should be un­
derstood as a non-compound and non-derivative noun, since this understanding 
is in keeping with the description (“[nouns] not comprising significant parts”) 
and the exemplification (gè - ‘earth’) given in the passage. We may also assume 
that the nouns which are referred to with the terms (onoma) triploun, tetraploun, 
pollaploun are compound nouns which are characterised by the presence of an 
appropriately greater number of significant components (or significant components 
and a non-significant component). Thus, in the typology presented by Aristotle 
two properties attract our attention. The first one has to do with the lack of dis­
tinction (at least of a terminological distinction) between composition and deriva­
tion, a lack which is manifested by the fact that the class onoma diploun includes 
both nouns which consist of two significant elements, i.e. two-part compounds, 
as well as nouns which consist of a significant and a non-significant element, and 
therefore most probably suffixal derivatives. The second peculiar property has to 
do with the reservation (formulated in both passages) that within the noun which 
constitutes an onoma diploun neither of its parts is characterised by meaning. 
Another striking fact is that the Philosopher makes no mention of composition as 
a word-formation strategy in his discussion of the rhema (‘the verb’) as another 
component of language (1457314-18).
4 This word is formed from the names of three rivers: Hermos, Ka'ikos and Xanthos 
(= Scamander), which flow near Phocaea in Asia Minor, where the colonists who 
established Massalia (Marseilles) originated from. This word probably functioned 
as an epithet of Zeus which was conferred to him in Massalia by the Phocaean 
colonists, so that it would remind them about their relationship with their for­
mer fatherland.
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The problem of the semanticity of compounds was also discussed by Aristotle 
in the first chapters of the Hermeneutics (Περί ερμηνείας), i.e. in one of the six 
treatises comprising the rudiments of the logic and methodology of the Philoso­
pher’s research which were later brought together in a collection known as the 
Organon. In the Hermeneutics the subject of discussion is language as the tool 
for expressing thoughts (έρμηνεία expression, utterance’); therefore, before the 
Philosopher begins to discuss linguistically expressed and logically verifiable 
statements about reality, he describes their components, i.e. individual words of 
which he distinguishes two basic classes: onomata (‘nouns’) and rhemata (‘verbs’). 
However, composition, being the object of a special analysis, is only brought up 
in the course of the description of the onoma:
Aristotelis Hermeneutica 16al9-26:5
5 The passage is quoted according to Montanari (1984:111).
Όνομα μέν ούν έστ'ι φωνή σημαντική κατά συνθήκην άνευ χρόνου, ής μηδέν 
μέρος έστ'ι σημαντικόν κεχωρισμένον· έν γάρ τφ Κάλλιππος τό ίππος ούδέν 
αύτό καθ’ αύτό σημαίνει, ώσπερ έν τφ λόγω τφ καλός ϊππος. Ού μήν ούδ’ ώσπερ 
έν τοΐς άπλοις όνόμασιν, ούτως έχει καί έν τοις πεπλεγμένοις· έν έκείνοις μέν 
γάρ ούδαμώς τό μέρος σημαντικόν, έν δέ τούτοις βούλεται μέν, άλλ’ ούδενός 
κεχωρισμένον, οίον έν τφ έπακτροκέλης τό κελης.
The noun is a sound which has meaning which is established by way of convention, 
without reference to time, a sound whose neither part has meaning in separation 
from the whole. For in the noun Kallippos the element -(h)ippos in itself does not 
mean anything, as it has meaning in the phrase kalos hippos [‘a beautiful horse’]. 
However, it is not so that if a thing manifests itself in simple nouns, it does so 
likewise in complex nouns; for in the former ones a part has no meaning at all, 
whereas in the latter ones a part has a meaning, but not in separation from the 
whole, as e.g. the element -keles in the name epaktrokeles.
In the passage quoted above, similarly as in the case of the definition of the onoma 
from the Poetics which was interpreted above, after the conventional nature of 
the semantic function of a noun and the lack of reference to time was enunciated, 
a specific declaration concerning the asemanticity of the parts of a noun is made 
again: φωνή [...] ής μηδέν μέρος έστί σημαντικόν κεχωρισμένον“ a sound whose nei­
ther part has meaning in separation from the whole”. And in a similar manner the 
validity of this statement is confirmed by reference to an example of a compound 
anthroponym Kallippos (Κάλλιππος), in which the component -(h)ippos is said not 
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to mean anything in itself, in contradistinction to an identical form (hippos) in the 
phrase kalos hippos (καλός ίππος ‘a beautiful horse’), which, as a separate word, 
is characterised by meaning. What follows is, however, somewhat surprising: 
here the Philosopher claims that there yet exists a difference between simple 
nouns (onomata hapla, ονόματα άπλά) and complex nouns (onomata peplegmena, 
ονόματα πεπλεγμένα), for in the former ones a part has no meaning at all (ούδαμώς 
to μέρος σημαντικόν), while in the latter ones it has a certain meaning (βούλεται), 
but not in separation from the whole (άλλ ’ ούδενός κεχωρισμένον). And as an ex­
ample of such a complex noun (onoma peplegmenon) the Philosopher provides the 
word epaktrokeles (έπακτροκέλης) in which the element -keles (κελης) is supposed 
to have a certain meaning, but not in separation from the whole. At the same 
time the context of this statement implies that the aforementioned anthroponym 
Kallippos constitutes an onoma haploun, which is particularly curious, especially 
due to the fact that a noun with an identical compound structure, i.e. Iheodoros, 
was classified as an onoma diploun in the passage 1457310-14 of the Poetics, which 
was quoted at the beginning. Therefore, what is the difference between the onoma 
diploun in the Poetics (Iheodoros) and the onoma peplegmenon in the Hermeneutics 
(epaktrokeles)? And in a similar manner, what is the difference between the onoma 
haploun (Kallippos) and the onoma peplegmenon (epaktrokeles) in the above cited 
passage of Hermeneutics? It seems that in order to understand the argument in the 
Hermeneutics and to establish the criterion which lies at the heart of the opposition 
onoma haploun : onoma peplegmenon it is crucial to comprehend the difference 
which Aristotle perceived in the way the signifying function of both exempla in 
the aforementioned passage is realised.
While the noun Kallippos does not present any special interpretative difficulties 
as far as the meaning of its constituent bases and its function as a proper name, 
the lexeme epaktrokeles does pose certain problems in this respect. Namely, this 
word is a noun composed of epaktris and keles. All three lexemes are very peculiar 
maritime terms whose meaning is difficult to establish today. We know that these 
names refer to three different types of ships, although we do not know if the latter 
differed in terms of their size, shape, equipment, purpose or some (other) general 
nautical parameters. Therefore, the relationship between the terms epaktrokeles and 
keles? remains difficult to establish.6 7 Nevertheless, the fact that Aristotle referred to 
6 And likewise epaktrokeles and epaktris.
7 Apart from the passage under discussion the term epaktrokeles appears in the entire 
corpus of preserved Greek literature only once, i.e. in the par. 191 of the speech Against
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this peculiar technical term out of many composite formations which constitute the 
resources of the Greek lexicon suggests that this word must correspond in some 
peculiar way to the criteria that the Philosopher established for the nouns to which 
he ascribed the status of onomatapeplegmena. E. Montanari (1988:123-126) may be 
on the right track when he likens the semantic and morphological structure of the 
Greek epaktrokeles to that of the Italian term brigantinogoletta, which is a compound 
consisting of brigantino and goletta. Brigantino is the name of a two-masted ship 
which has square-rigged sails on both masts, i.e. sails that are carried by a hori­
zontal beam (yard) attached to the mast halfway through its length. Goletta is also 
the name of a two-masted vessel, although the latter features gaffsails on both 
masts, i.e. the sails are suspended on an obliquely-placed (in reference to the mast), 
movable pole (gaff) attached to the mast on one end. Whereas brigantinogoletta 
is a term which denotes a two-masted vessel which has square-rigged sails on 
one mast and gaffsails on the other.8 And therefore -goletta, as the component of 
the name brigantinogoletta, is characterised by a certain meaning, for it provides 
the information that one of the masts of this two-masted vessel features gaffsails. 
This meaning is realised only within this name, whereas it disappears in separation 
from this name, for goletta as an independent word denotes a ship with two gaff- 
rigged masts. We may assume that, mutatis mutandis, an analogous function could 
have been performed by the element -keles in the compound name epaktrokeles. 
Therefore the meaning which is mentioned by Aristotle in his argument is not the 
abstract, lexical semanticity of a part of a (composite) word, but its semanticity 
within that word. So, when the Philosopher says that this part (μέρος) has no 
meaning in separation from the whole (ούδενός κεχωρισμενον), the latter phrase 
should not be understood as equipollent to ούκ έν τω όνόματι, but as κεχωρισμενον 
έν τώ όνόματι, for apart from the word epaktrokeles, keles carries meaning as a name 
in itself, although a different one than -keles in the name epaktrokeles. And it is 
the latter meaning that disappears, if this element is separated from the name 
whose part it constitutes. Therefore, it seems that by referring to this example
Timarchos by Aeschines, from which we can learn nothing more than that the ship 
referred to with this term was used by pirates; cf.:... ai προπετεΐς τού σώματος ήδοναί 
καί τό μηδέν ικανόν ήγεϊσθαι, ταύτα πληροί τά ληστήρια, ταΰτ εις τόν έπακτροκέλητα 
έμβιβάζει, ταύτά έστιν έκάστω Πολνή, ταύτα παρακελεύεται σφάττειν τούς πολίτας, 
νπηρετείν τοϊς τνράννοις, συγκαταλύειν τόν δήμον.
8 In Polish the following names correspond to these terms (respectively): szkuner (Eng. 
schooner), bryg (Eng. brig) and szkunerbryg (Eng. obs. schooner brig). 
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the Philosopher desired to emphasise that even if a part of a composite word has 
a certain meaning, then this meaning is completely determined by the meaning of 
the remaining components and the word as a whole. Consequently, the meaning 
of a part of a word constitutes only a dependent element of the meaning of that 
word as a whole and its existence is justified exclusively within the context of this 
word. Thereby Aristotle could demonstrate that nouns of this kind, i.e. onomata 
peplegmena, also do not go beyond the general definition of the noun, which states 
that no part of it has meaning in separation from the whole (φωνή [...] ής μηδέν 
μέρος έστί σημαντικόν κεχωρισμένον).9
9 The analysed passage is also discussed in Wolanin (1995: 257-260), together with yet 
another one (16629-33) *n which Aristotle refers to a speciously compound noun (μύς).
As we summarise all statements of the Stagirite about compound nouns, ex­
pressed both in the Poetics and in Hermeneutics, and as we attempt to answer the 
questions which were asked before, we should state that each of these two works 
postulates a different classification, based on different criteria, which is also man­
ifested in a slightly different terminology. In the Poetics the opposition onoma 
haploun ·. onoma diploun (triploun, tetraploun, pollaploun) is based exclusively on 
the number of elements in a given word such that are characterised by meaning 
outside the context of the given word, i.e. as separate words. We are told that 
within a given word none of these elements is “significant in itself” (αύτό καθ’ αυτό 
σημαίνον); that is to say, it does not have autonomous meaning. As we can see, this 
typology is purely morphological in nature and its criterion is associated with the 
number of word-formation bases found in a given word (or the lack of such bases). 
On the other hand, in the Hermeneutics the opposition onoma haploun : onoma 
peplegmenon is based not on the number of independently meaningful elements 
in a word, but on the way in which they function within this word. And thus 
we are told that within the onoma haploun the elements do not mean anything 
in themselves (ούδέν αύτό καθ’ αύτό σημαίνει), they do not have any meaning at 
all (ούδαμώς τό μέρος σημαντικόν), whereas within the onoma peplegmenon they 
have a certain meaning (βούλεται) but not in separation from the whole word 
(άλλ ’ ούδενός κεχωρισμένον). Thus, this division does not refer to morphological 
simplicity or compoundhood but to the semantic simplicity/complexity, which 
is functional in nature. Within the framework of this typology the class onomata 
hapla involves both non-compound (i.e. simple) nouns (which also constitute on­
omata hapla according to the classification introduced in the Poetics), and those 
compound nouns (i.e. onomata dipla, according to the classification in the Poetics) 
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whose components do not determine the semantic function of a given noun as 
a whole, i.e. such as Kallippos,10 which is a conventional anthroponym identifying 
specific people regardless of whether there is any relationship between those 
people and (beautiful) horses or not. Whereas onomata peplegmena are those 
compound nouns (i.e. onomata dipla, according to the morphological classification 
of the Poetics) whose components determine (to a certain extent) the meaning of 
a given noun as a whole by contributing a certain amount of information about 
the specific properties of its referent, that is nouns such as epaktrokeles, with the 
reservation that this information is realised only within this noun and not in 
separation from this noun, because in the latter context, i.e. if the components 
function as separate words, their semantics (informative value) changes. Thus the 
onoma haploun which is confronted in the Poetics with the onoma diploun (triploun, 
tetraploun), and the onoma haploun which is confronted in the Hermeneutics with 
the onoma peplegmenon, are terms which, although formally identical, express 
two distinct notions, i.e. the former refers to the noun which is non-composite 
morphologically, and the latter refers to the noun which is non-complex seman­
tically. And in a similar manner the onoma diploun in the Poetics and the onoma 
peplegmenon in the Hermeneutics are not two editorial variants of the same term, 
but are two terms whose content is different. The first of these terms denotes 
a morphologically composite noun (i.e. a compound) and the second term a noun 
which is semantically complex.
10 And Theodoros likewise.
It is also due to the above indicated difference in the non-simplicity of nouns 
that in both texts, i.e. in the Poetics and in the Hermeneutics, the Stagirite uses 
the terms which refer to the (a)semanticity of the parts of nouns in a slightly 
different manner. In the Poetics he introduces no distinction as far as the intralex- 
ical semanticity of the parts of compound nouns (dipla) is concerned, therefore 
the parts of both these nouns and the simple nouns (hapla) were referred to 
as asemantic αύτά καθ’ αύτά, i.e. ‘by themselves’ (1457310-14). Whereas in the 
Hermeneutics such a distinction was introduced, therefore in the general defini­
tion of the noun as such, propounded in this text, these parts were referred to 
as asemantic κεχωρισμενα, i.e. in separation from the context constituted by the 
meaning of the noun as a whole. Consequently, this definition includes both 
semantically simple nouns (hapla) such as Kallippos, whose parts do not have 
meaning not only κεχωρισμενα, but also αύτά καθ’ αύτά, as well as semantically 
complex nouns (peplegmena), as for example epaktrokeles, whose parts are not 
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asemantic αύτά καθ’ αύτά (cf.: έν δέ τούτοις [τό μέρος] βούλεται), but only as 
κεχωρισμένα (cf.: άλλ' ούδενός κεχωρισμένον). It also seems understandable that 
it is in the Hermeneutics that Aristotle presented an in-depth interpretation of 
the semantics of compounds. As we have already mentioned, this treatise be­
longs among Aristotle’s writings on logic and it refers to the linguistic means of 
expressing thoughts, and especially propositions. It was therefore necessary to 
establish at the beginning the logical status of the thing which is expressed by an 
individual word (noun). And as far as the Philosopher is concerned, his answer 
is that: firstly, regardless of the compoundhood of the noun it always expresses 
only one notion which may become an object of logical operations (predication). 
And therefore such expressions as e.g. Kallippos trekhei (‘Kallippos runs’) or epa- 
ktrokeles plei (‘an epaktrokeles sails’) constitute propositions, in which subjects 
of predication are constituted by single notions, i.e. a man known as Kallippos 
and a vessel known as epatrokeles, respectively. Thus neither the horse nor the 
vessel known as keles constitute any components of these propositions. Secondly, 
the consequences of the compoundhood of the noun for its denotational value 
may be twofold, i.e. it may be either irrelevant in this regard, as in the case of the 
name Kallippos (in which the component -(h)ippos does not determine people for 
whom this name is appropriate in any way, due to the complete conventionalisa­
tion of this name11), or it may influence the denotational value of the noun, as in 
the case of the name epaktrokeles (in which the word-formative component -keles 
co-decides about the adequacy of this noun in reference to the specific class of 
vessels). Thereby the Philosopher indicated the necessity to distinguish (or even to 
separate) the morphological plane from the plane of functional (logical) semantics, 
or, to be more precise, he indicated that the morphological (i.e. word-formation) 
structure of a noun and the way its semantics functions on the plane of logic are 
relatively independent, or at least not completely congruent. We should empha­
sise, however, that while the descriptions of nouns presented in the Poetics and in 
the Hermeneutics are different, they are not contradictory, and the element they 
share is the strongly emphasised lack of the semantic autonomy of the morpho­
logical components of a compound. This lack is reflected either in the complete 
asemanticity of such a component within a name (-doros in lheodoros, -(h)ippos 
in Kallippos), or in the fact that its semanticity is relative, manifested as a factor 
identifying specific properties of the referent of the noun as a whole and not as 
an exponent of a separate referent (-keles in epaktrokeles).
11 The same could have been said about the name Theodoros and its component -doros.
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In the grammatical tradition the problem of compounds appears in a completely 
different context. In the treatise entitled The Art of Grammar (Tekhne grammatike, 
Τέχνη γραμματική), which is attributed to Dionysius Ihrax (170-90 bc) 12 13and which 
contains an exposition of the Alexandrian science of the morphology of the word, 
the questions concerning words formed by means of composition are discussed 
in chapters dealing with the particular classes of words (parts of speech). In these 
chapters appropriate grammatical properties or accidents (παρεπόμενα, parepomena) 
are ascribed to specific classes of words. These properties include both inflexional 
and word-formative categories. The latter ones are discussed in chapters treating 
the onoma (‘a noun’), rhema (‘a verb’) and antonymia (‘a pronoun’). And thus 
in the chapter concerning the onoma we may read the following words:
12 The attribution of this treatise was and continues to be a source of controversy, 
although the majority of researchers accept the opinion that its content reflects 
the grammatical knowledge whose bulk was formed in the 2nd-ist century bc in the 
milieu of Alexandrian philologists and whose particular points were modified and 
enhanced by the subsequent generations of Greek grammarians over the course of 
centuries. On the status quaestionis see Law, Sluiter (1995).
13 All quotes are provided according to Uhlig (1883).
14 Cf. 25, 3-5.
Dionysii Ihracis Ars grammatica 24, 6-7:”
Παρέπεται δέ τώ όνόματι πέντε· γένη, ε'ίδη, σχήματα, αριθμοί, πτώσεις.
Five (properties) accompany a noun: genera, forms, structures, numbers, cases.
So, beside the inflexional categories of gender, number and case, also two word-for­
mation categories were classified as accidents (parepomena) which accompany 
the noun, i.e. the eidos (είδος) ‘form’ and skhema (σχήμα) ‘structure’. The former 
refers to morphological derivability/non-derivability and is based on the opposi­
tion eidosprototypon ‘a basic (= non-derived) form’ (ge- ‘earth’): eidos paragogon 
‘a derived form’ (gaieios - ‘earthly’),14 whereas it is the skhema which refers to 
morphological compoundhood or lack thereof. The latter property is expressed 
in the following way:
Dionysii Ihracis Ars grammatica 29, 5-7:
Σχήματα δέ ονομάτων έστ'ι τρία· άπλούν, σύνθετον, παρασύνθετον· άπλοϋν μέν 
οιον Μέμνων, σύνθετον δέ οιον Αγαμέμνων, παρασύνθετον δέ οίον Αγαμεμνο- 
νίδης, Φιλιππίδης.
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There are three structures of a noun: simple, compound and the one which is de­
rived from the compound; the simple structure is e.g. Memnon, the compound one 
is e.g. Agamemnon, and the structure which is derived from the compound one is 
e.g. Agamemnonides, Philippides.
According to this description, the category of skhema (‘structure’) is based on the 
tri-partite opposition: skhema haploun (‘the simple structure’) : skhema suntheton 
(‘the compound structure’) : skhema parasuntheton (‘the structure derived from the 
compound one’), and at the same time it constitutes a criterion for distinguishing 
three types of nouns: a simple noun, a compound, and a derivative of a compound. 
Further on, four more kinds of compounds, called suntheton diaforai (συνθέτων 
διάφοροί), are distinguished. These are described as follows:
Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica 30,1-4:
Τών δέ συνθέτων διαφοραί είσι τέσσαρες. ά μέν γάρ αύτών είσιν έκ δύο τελείων, 
ώς Χειρίσοφος, ά δέ έκ δύο άπολειπόντων, ώς Σοφοκλής, ά δέ έξ άπολείποντος καί 
τελείου, ώς Φιλόδημος, ά δέ έκ τελείου καί άπολείποντος, ώς Περικλής.
There are four kinds of compound nouns; some of them consist of two whole 
[words] as e.g. Kheirisophos, others consist of two abbreviated words, such as 
e.g. Sophokles, others consist of one abbreviated and one whole word, such as e.g. 
Philodemos, still other consist of a whole word and an abbreviated word, such 
as e.g. Perikles.
As we can see, these suntheton diaforai are four classes of nominal compounds, 
distinguished on the basis of the form of the lexical elements which correspond 
to its word-formation bases.15 It is peculiar that both in this passage as in the one 
quoted before the whole exemplificatory material includes exclusively proper 
names (anthroponyms) with a clear morphological structure, and the typology is 
based solely on the formal factor of a morphological nature, while the semantic 
aspect is completely omitted.
15 However, in the case of the name Perikles we are actually dealing with a préfixai form, 
in which the prefix is formally identical with the preposition peri ‘round about, around’.
The description of the skhema in reference to the verb (rhema) is presented 
in a similar manner:
Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica 50, 3 - 51,1:
Σχήματα τρία, άπλοϋν, σύνθετον, παρασύνθετον· άπλοϋν μέν οίον φρονώ, σύν­
θετον δέ οίον καταφρονώ, παρασύνθετον δέ οίον άντιγονίζω, φιλιππίζω.
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There are three structures: a simple one, a compound one and the one which is 
derived from the compound one; the simple one is e.g. phrono, the compound 
one is e.g. kataphrono, and the one derived from the compound one is e.g. anti- 
gonidzo, philippidzo.
In this case, as an example of a compound the author cites the préfixai formation 
kataphrono (καταφρονώ) ‘I look down upon, I think slightly of’, in which an agglu­
tinated preposition kata (κατά) ‘downwards, under’ acts as the prefix. The examples 
of derivatives of compounds the author provides, i.e. antigonidzo (άντιγονίζω) and 
philippidzo (φιλιππίζω), are denominai formations which are based on compound 
proper names (anthroponyms) Antigonos (Αντίγονος) and Philippos (Φίλιππος) and 
which mean the act of supporting (or being the supporter of) people who bear 
these names. In contradistinction to the onoma, no kinds of verbal compounds, 
i.e. suntheton diaforai (συνθέτων διαφοραί), are distinguished.
The description of the skhema as a property of pronouns (antonumiai) is limited 
to a bipartite opposition: skhema haploun (‘a simple structure’) : skhema suntheton 
(‘a compound structure’) and to this very opposition the difference between the 
personal pronouns and the reflexive pronouns is reduced:
Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica 68,1-2:
Σχήματα δύο, άπλοΰν, σύνθετον- άπλοϋν μεν οίον εμού, σου, ού, σύνθετον δε 
έμαυτού, σαυτού, αύτού.
There are two structures: a simple and a compound one; the simple one is e.g. 
emou, sou, hou, and the compound one is e.g. emautou, sautou, hautou.
We also encounter the division of words into simple ones (hapla) and compound 
ones (suntheta) in the chapter devoted to the adverb (epirrhema), although no ref­
erence is made to the notion of skhema. In any case, no parepomena are mentioned 
there, though right after a brief definition of the adverb we read the following words:
Dionysii Thracis Ars grammatica 73, 1-2:
Των δε επιρρημάτων τα μέν έστι απλά, τά δέ σύνθετα- απλά μέν ώς πάλαι, 
σύνθετα δέ ώς πρόπαλαι.
Among adverbs there are those which are simple, and others which are compound; 
the simple one is e.g. palai ('long ago’), the compound one is e.g. propalai (‘very 
long ago’).
So, it is easy to see that this description of adverbs focuses just on their structure 
(skhema), testimony of which is furnished both by the terminology which is used 
and the examples which are provided.
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As far as the description of words belonging to other classes (other parts of 
speech) is concerned, there is no information concerning their possible compound­
hood. What is peculiar in the light of this is that in the chapter devoted to conjunc­
tions (sundesmoi), the examples that are provided to illustrate their various semantic 
types (conjunctive, disjunctive, purpose-related, explicative etc.) are characterised 
by compoundhood which is indeed striking, as is the case of causal conjunctions 
(92,2-3), where the author enumerates epei, epeiper, epeide, epeideperfaei, έπείπερ, 
έπειδή, έπειδήπερ) in one go but he fails to mention their skhema.
In conclusion we should state that in the treatise under discussion com­
poundhood of words is presented in the context of a general description of the 
grammatical features of the particular parts of speech. However, this presenta­
tion is spoilt by the lack of a conceptual and terminological distinction between 
word-formation and inflexion. This is because compoundhood is discussed in 
the context of one of the accidents (parepomena) of specific classes of words, 
i.e. skhema, whose status is not distinguished from the status of the parepomena 
comprising inflexional categories. The essence of the skhema actually has to do 
with the variance simplex (haplouri) - compositum (suntheton) - decomposition 
(parasunthetori), and the manner and scope of the description of compounds them­
selves (suntheta) is limited to a division of nouns into kinds (diaforai) according to 
the schematically-conceived form in which word-formation bases are represented 
in them (a whole word vs. an abbreviated word). Consequently, the constituents 
of compounds are not appropriately interpreted as regards either their formal 
(grammatical) features or their semantic value. However, bearing in mind the 
historical context of this text, it seems that the general classification of facts 
related to compoundhood, which is presented in this text, as well as the attempt 
at finding an appropriate place for this phenomenon in the general description 
of the grammatical system of the language, deserve credit.
In the Tekhne grammatike compoundhood is presented as one of the systemic 
properties of words, constituting, together with inflexional properties, their gen­
eral morphological characteristics, whereas in the four-volume treatise On Syntax 
(Peri tes suntaxeos, Περί τής συντάξεως) by Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd century ad) 
this phenomenon is presented mainly through the perspective of the definitional 
features of compounds and the criteria which enable one to distinguish com­
pounds from syntagms, and therefore in the context of the demarcation between 
morphology and syntax.
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In reference to compound words Apollonius generally uses the term sunthesis 
(σύνθεσις) or (onoma) suntheton ((όνομα) σύνθετον), as well as occasionally sun­
taxis (συντάξις). In the second book (par. 161) he writes that the peculiar feature 
of each compound is the fact that its composite nature is confirmed both in the 
form, i.e. phone (φωνή), as well as in the meaning, i.e. deloumenon (δηλουμένον). 
The following words are to be found in the relevant passage:16
16 All quotations from Apollonius’ work are provided according to the edition by Uh­
lig (1910); translations according to Householder (1981).
17 A compound made from σκύτος ‘leather’ and τόμος ‘cut’.
18 This remark for sure reflects Aristotle’s view presented above.
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 2,161:
Έν γάρ τώ μισογύνης καί τό μισεΐν έγκειται καί ή γυνή, καί έν τώ φιλόπονος τό 
φιλεΐν καί ό πόνος, ού γάφ τα έν μιςι λέξει άπλή πλείονα σημαίνοντα σύνθετα, 
ώς έπί τού τοξότης, σκυτεύς, καν ενέργειαν σημαίνη τήν τού τέμνειν, εί μή καί 
τήν φωνήν προσλάβοι έν τψ σκυτοτόμος. ’Εντεύθεν τό Αρίσταρχος καί τα τούτω 
όμοια κύρια όντα προς ένίων ού κατηριθμεΐτο εις τα σύνθετα, ότι μή καί τοίς 
δηλουμένοις έκέχρητο. Άλλ’ έπί γε τούτων έδείκνυτο ώς ή πρώτη σύνθεσις 
έπεκράτει, καθώς έχει τό αρίσταρχος Ζεύς παρά τοίς περί Βακχυλίδην, καί ούχ 
ή έξ ύστέρου γενομένη συμβολική μετάθεσις.
For instance, in misogunes (‘woman-hater’) it is clear that both misein (‘hate’) 
and gunê (‘woman’) are present both in form and in meaning, and in philoponos 
(‘work-loving’) both philein (‘love’) and ponos (‘work’). And even if two or more 
semantic parts are present in one simple word, it is not [necessarily] a compound - 
e.g. toxotes (‘bowman’) or skuteus (‘shoemaker’, ‘leather-worker’); although the 
notion of temnein (‘cutting’ of leather) is present [in sfcuteus], it’s not a compound 
unless ‘cut’ is present in form, as well, as in skutotomos17 18(‘leather-cutter’, ‘shoe­
maker’). Hence Aristarchos and similar words which are proper names are not 
counted as compounds by some, because they don’t use the meaning of the parts 
to make a meaningful whole.” But on this point we tried to show [in a lost work] 
that the original composition prevails, as in Bacchylides 12, 58, aristarchos Zeus 
(‘Zeus ruler of the best’ or ‘best of rulers’) [in determining that it is a compound], 
and not the later transfer by convention to use as a proper name.
As we can see, for Apollonius the criterion which conditions the attribution of the 
status of compound to a word has to do with co-occurrence of specific formal and 
semantic properties. On the one hand, the presence of two word-formation bases, 
identifiable in the sound layer of the word, and on the other hand, the complex 
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semantics of the word, which results from an interplay of the meanings of these 
bases, turn out to be indispensable. This necessary symmetry of formal and se­
mantic factors enables the author to eliminate the word skuteus from the class of 
compounds, despite the fact that he ascribes to it the presence of “more semantic 
parts”. This ascription is of course a result of an (erroneous) identification of the 
designatory (referential) meaning of this word with the word-formative (structural, 
etymological) meaning of the synonymous word skutotomos. On the other hand, 
this symmetry does not force the author to question the word-formative composite 
nature of the anthroponym Aristarchos, despite the fact that as a conventional proper 
name it does not manifest a composite designatory meaning, for in this case our 
grammarian may recognise its “composite original meaning” as the decisive factor, 
i.e. the word-formative (etymological) meaning which this word manifested as 
a common adjective. In this respect the grammarian could have also made additional 
reference to this use of the word as an attributive determiner of Zeus in the poetry 
of the archaic poet Bacchylides, who lived at the turn of the 5th century.
However, in his discussion of compounds Apollonius focuses on the question 
of how to distingish compounds, i.e. one-word synthetic structures (suntheseis), 
from two-word analytical structures, i.e. parathetical ones (paratheseis), to use 
his terminology. The matter is not as obvious as it seems, for on the one hand, in 
the antiquity texts were usually written in continuo, i.e. without spaces between 
words (and without accent marks), and on the other hand, from early on the 
Greeks had an intuitive understanding of the concept of word, and this an idea 
rather than a term, since as regards terms, there were several in use, e.g. όνομα, 
λέξις, μέρος λόγου and the like. Therefore, grammarians faced the task of defining 
this concept theoretically in grammatical terms, even more so because in this 
case there was no recourse to orthography.
The criteria which according to Apollonius help distinguish compounds 
(i.e. synthetic, one-word constructions) from analytical structures (i.e. two-word, 
parathetical constructions) are not uniform. Generally speaking, in this regard it 
is possible to point out criteria of prosodic, morphological, morphosyntactic and 
morphosemantic nature.
As far as the prosodic criteria are concerned, one of them consists in the pres­
ence of only one accent within a given structure. The appropriate passage in Apol­
lonius reads as follows:
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 4, 1-3:
Τά πλεϊστα τών μερών του λόγου διά τής ένώσεως τού τόνου τό μοναδικόν τής 
λέξεως υπαγορεύει, τουτέστι τό εν μέρος λόγου είναι, ή διά τής μονής τής καθ’ 
Ancient Greeks on compounds ... 835
έκαστον μόριον τό δισσόν εμφαίνει των λέξεων. Τό γάρ Διός κόρος παροξυνόμενον 
μέν τήν γενικήν έχει ίδίςι νοουμένην, δμοιον δν τώ Διός υιός, προπαροξυνόμενον 
δέ δμοιόν έστι τώ Διόγνητος, Διόδοτος. [...] Τό δέ καταγραφω ε’ίτε δύο μέρη λόγου 
έστίν είτε καί έν, ούκ ένδείκνυται διά της τάσεως. Και τά τούτοις όμοια, τό άποίκου, 
καταφέροντος, άπαντα τά τοιαύτα, τής αυτής έχεται αμφιβολίας.
With most words the unitary nature of a [compound] word, i.e. that it is just one 
word (meros logou), is shown by its single accent, whereas the fact that two separate 
accents remain on the individual words (morion) of a phrase shows that there are 
two words. The expression Dios koros (“Son of Zeus’ or ‘one of the twins Castor 
and Pollux’) when accented with an acute-on-the-penult (paroxunetai) conveys 
the genitive relationships [i.e. that Dios is a genitive modifying fcoros], parallel to 
Dios huios (‘Son of Zeus’), but if accented only with an acute-on-the-antepenult 
(proparoxunetai) [i.e. Dioskoros], it is a compound, similar to Diognetos or Diodotos 
[proper names, etymologically ‘Zeus-born’ and ‘Zeus-given’]. [...] But katagrapho 
(T write down’, ‘I list’) [for instance], does not indicate by its accent whether 
it is two words or one [since kata grapho is phonetically identical with kata­
grapho, the grave accent having the same value as no accent]. And other words 
of this sort, e.g. apoikou (‘of a colonist’ or ap’oikou ‘from home’), katapherontos 
(‘of a down-bringer’ or kata pherontos ‘concerning a bearer’) and the rest suffer 
from the same ambiguity (amphibolia).
As we can see, the occurrence of a single accent is presented here as a necessary, 
but not sufficient, factor to consider a given structure a synthetic one. In other 
words, all compounds (synthetic structures) must have only one accent, but not 
all structures which have one accent must be synthetic ones. The situation in 
which a structure with one accent is not synthetic but parathetic in nature refers 
to expressions whose first element is an adverb or a preposition and the second 
element is a verbal or nominal form. The reduction of the number of accents to 
one in such structures results from the possible weakening19 of the acute ccent in 
the first element (i.e. the change from the acute accent to the grave accent, when 
it rests on the final syllable of this element - κατά γράφω, κατά φεροντος), or from 
the possible disappearance (elision) of the final accented vowel in this element 
(άπ ο’ίκου), whereas their ambiguity, and therefore their possible synthetic nature, 
results from the common process of grammaticalisation of their first (i.e. adver­
bial or prepositional) element. This process caused these elements to assume the 
status of a prefix and thus the entire structures to assume the nature of words 
(and not phrases), treated by Apollonius as compounds (suntheseis).
19 In practice this weakening is close to a complete disappearance.
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The second prosodic criterion is the shift of the accent to the beginning of 
the word, which is peculiar to compounds. This phenomenon is discussed by 
Apollonius in paragraph 12 of the fourth book of his treatise On Syntax. In this 
paragraph the author considers structures with prepositions and prefixes similar 
to the ones discussed above, referred to with the cover term protheseis ‘prepo­
sitions’. However, in this case the object of analysis is exclusively combinations 
of these protheseis with nominal forms. Moreover, a criterion of morphological 
nature is also introduced in this context:
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 4,12:
Προτιθέμεναι δή [αί προθέσεις] τών του λόγου μερών ή κατά σύνθεσίν είσιν 
ή κατά παράθεσιν. Έν μέν ούν ταΐς εϋθείαις τών πτωτικών καί έτι ταϊς συ- 
νυπαρχούσαις κλητικαΐς ούκ έστι τήν παράθεσιν τών προθέσεων έπινοήσαι. 
Πρόδηλον γάρ δτι τό σύνοικος, έπίκουρος, σύνδουλος, ϋπέρδουλος, πάροικος, 
μέτοικος, έκδηλος, ανάδρομος, περίοπτος, περιφόρητος, σύνθεσίν τήν τών μερών 
άνεδέξαντο, ού μόνον διά τόν άναδραμόντα τόνον κατά τήν σύνθεσίν (έπεί καί 
τινά γε συνεφύλαξε τήν αύτήν τάσιν καί ού <τή> μονή τού τόνου απολύεται τής 
συνθέσεως, ώς έχει τό περικλυτός, αναδρομή, συνοχή, καταμονή, άλλα πλεΐστα), 
άλλα καί έκ του συνυπάρχειν κατά πάντα σχηματισμόν τήν πρόθεσιν, δπερ 
ού παρεπόμενόν έστι ταΐς έκ παραθέσεως, ώς έχει τό κατά Κτησιφώντος, ύπέρ 
Άριστάρχου, ού συμφερόμενα κατά πάσαν πτώσιν διά τής αύτής συντάξεως· τά 
γε μήν προεκκείμενα κατά τήν εύθεΐαν κατά πάσαν πτώσιν σύνεστιν.
Prepositions combine with other parts of speech either in compounds or in phrases. 
In combination with nominatives or vocatives, phrasal construction is ruled out 
[so such forms must be compounds] .So, obviously, if you see the [nominative] forms 
sunoikos (‘fellow-inhabitant’), epikouros (‘ally’), sùndoulos (‘fellow-slave’), hupér- 
dou/os (‘super-slave’), pdroifcos (‘neighbour’), métoikos (‘resident, alien, immigrant’), 
ékdêlos (‘conspicuous’), anadromos (‘running uphill’), perioptos (‘conspicuous’), 
periphôrêtos (portable’), you know that they exhibit composition of the two parts, 
not just because of the recessive accent of composition (since some compounds 
preserve the underlying accent [of the second member] and so, because of the 
persistence of the accent, their identity as compounds cannot be determined by 
that test - e.g. periklutôs (‘far-famed’), anadromé (‘up-shooting’), sunoché (‘coher­
ence’), katamoné (‘permanence’), and many more) but also from the continuance 
of the combination through the whole declension (schématismes), which is not 
a property of prepositional phrases like katà Ktësiphontos (‘against Ctesiphon’) or 
hupèr Aristârchou (‘on behalf of Aristarchus’), which cannot be declined in every 
case while preserving the basic construction. But combinations which occur in 
the nominative remain the same through all cases [and are compounds].
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Thus, unlike the aforementioned single-accent criterion, the shift of accent to the 
beginning is presented as a sufficient and therefore decisive factor in classifying 
a structure as synthetic, but not as a necessary one. The lack of such a shift does 
not preclude compoundhood, because there are structures which do not feature 
such a shift (periklutôs, anadromé, sunoché, katamoné) which are nevertheless 
considered compounds. Here Apollonius makes reference to a morphological 
criterion which has to do with the distributive properties of the components 
of a given structure, i.e. their connectivity described on the basis of inflexional 
categories. Namely, the author proves that both structures such as σύνδουλος 
(with accent shift), and structures like such as περικλυτός (without accent shift), 
are compounds, for the protheseis which occur in them, i.e. συν and περί in the 
aforementioned examples respectively, may combine with all inflexional forms of 
the nominal components, i.e. they may form structures with the nominal component 
not only in the nominative case (σύνδουλος, περικλυτός), but also in the genitive 
(συνδούλου, περικλυτοΰ), the dative (συνδούλω, περικλυτώ) or in the accusative 
(σύνδολον, περικλυτόν). This makes (synthetic) combinations of this kind (i.e. com­
pounds) different from (parathetical) structures (i.e. prepositional phrases) such 
as κατά Κτησιφώντος or υπέρ Άριστάρχου, in which the prothesis cannot combine 
with all inflexional forms of the nominal component.20 The nominative and the 
vocative cases are also excluded in such a context; therefore, the connectibility 
of the prothesis with the nominative case amounts to its connectibility with all 
inflexional forms of the nominal component and thereby constitutes a premise 
to recognise the structure consisting of a prothesis and of a nominal component 
in the nominative case (i.e. a structure such as σύνδουλος or περικλυτός) as a syn­
thetic one (i.e. as a one-word compound). In other words, the lack of distributive 
restrictions on the component constituted by the prothesis (i.e. its co-occurrence 
with nominal forms in the nominative case and in all oblique cases) enables us 
to recognise a given structure as a synthetic one (a compound), whereas if the 
prothesis may only be accompanied by one or a few oblique cases of the nominal 
component a given structure has to be considered a parathetical one (an analytic, 
two-word structure).
20 In the former example the nominal component may occur only in the genitive or in 
the accusative, whereas in the latter - exclusively in the genitive.
In consequence, the aforementioned morphological criterion allows one to 
distinguish synthetic structures (i.e. compounds) from parathetical ones (i.e. two- 
word phrases) in a less ambiguous way than in the case of the prosodic (accentual) 
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criteria which were discussed previously, and it is indeed appropriate for structures 
to which Apollonius applied it. However, it is not universal, for not every struc­
ture which is ambiguous with respect to the distinction between compounds and 
phrases contains a prothesis, and, on the other hand, not every structure which 
does contain a prothesis features a nominal component. Therefore, in connection 
to these Apollonius’ discourse mentions yet another morphological criterion, 
namely the presence or absence of formal changes at the boundary between the 
components of a structure as far as inflexion is concerned. This criterion is invoked 
exactly in the case of combinations of a prothesis and a verb, such as καταγράφω 
(T write down’), which, according to the grammarian’s firm assertion, are always 
synthetic in nature, i.e. they always constitute compounds (4,32). This claim is not 
self-evident and demands special justification, for Apollonius generally accepts the 
view that “no kind of compound word allows any change at the point of juncture, 
whereas in phrases sometimes [the first word] may be varied”.21 The veracity of 
this statement is allegedly confirmed, on the one hand, by structures such as 
λεοντόφωνος ‘lion-voiced’, χειρογραφώ T hand-write’, κερασφόρος ‘horn-wearing’, 
Άστυάναξ‘City-king’, which are indeed compounds and therefore “no matter how 
you change the inflection, there is never any change at the compound boundary”,22 
and on the other hand, by structures such as Νέα πόλις ‘New City (Naples)’, αγαθός 
δαίμων ‘good spirit’, Άρεϊος πάγος ‘Hill of Ares (Areopagus)’, which, as “real phrases, 
do allow inflection at the boundary”,23 e.g. in the genitive: Νέας πόλεως, αγαθού 
δαίμονος, Αρείου πάγου. Consequently, the point is that the peculiar property of 
compounds is that they open only one slot for (a string of) inflexional morphemes 
at the end of the whole structure, whereas the aforementioned phrases combining 
an adjective and a noun in a relation of concord with each other, open two such 
slots, one of which is located at the end of the adjective, and therefore just at the 
boundary between the two components. Yet, the past tense forms of (prefixed) 
verbs such as καταγράφω (T write down’) assume (as is the case with all other 
verbs) an augment located before the verbal stem, e.g. κατέγραψα (T wrote down’), 
and so the change occurs right at the boundary between the two components of 
the structure, which could suggest that it more likely has the status of a phrase 
21 Cf. 4,33: Τά οπωσδήποτε συντεθέντα των μερών τού λόγου, καθ δ μέρος ήνωται, άμετάθετά 
έστιν, τά γε μήν παρακείμενα διάφορον έσ& δτε τήν παράθεσιν ποιείται.
22 Cf. 4. 33: ού γάρ δή γε έπί τούτων κατά τάς διαφόρους κλίσεις τά τής συνάφειας τών 
λέξεων ποτέ μετατίθεται.
23 Cf. 4, 34: Τά γε μήν έν παραθέσει όντα έχει τό καί μετατίθεσθαι.
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(parathesis) instead of a compound (sun thesis). However, Apollonius defends the 
synthetic nature of such words by writing the following:
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 4, 40-41:
Ούκ οίητέον κεκλίσθαι τα άπό προθέσεως άρχόμενα κατά τούς παρωχημένους 
χρόνους, συντεθεϊσθαί γε μην κατά τήν έκαστου διαφοράν, φ γάρ λόγφ παρά τό 
γράφω έγένετο καταγράφω, τούτφ καί παρά τό έγραψα τό κατέγραψα. [...] Τούτου 
δέ άπόδειξις ίκανωτάτη γένοιτο τό καί παρωχημένους ίδίφε ποτέ συντεθεϊσθαί μή 
όντων ένεστώτων, καί έτι μέλλοντας καί ένεστώτας ούκ όντων παρφχημένων· 
δπερ εί παρείπετο τό έξ ένεστώτος άρχεσθαι τάς συνθέσεις καί μετιέναι έπί τούς 
παρωχημένους, παρείπετο άν τό μή ίδίφε συντεθεϊσθαί παρφχημένων χωρίς τής 
κατά τόν ενεστώτα συνθέσεως. κατέφαγόν φαμεν ούδεμιάς οϋσης ύπομνήσεως τού 
ένεστώτος, καί έτι κατοίσω ούκ οϋσης χρήσεως τής κατά τόν ένεστώτα, ούδέ μήν 
τής κατά τόν παρφχημένον- καί έτι κατά τόν ένεστώτα άπειμί φαμεν ούκ όντων 
προδήλων τών παρφχημένων. ϊδίςκ άρα οίητέον έκαστον χρόνον τήν σύνθεσιν 
άναδεδέχθαι, καθό έκαστος ρητός ών ούκ έν άπαντι διαφόρφ χρόνφ σύνθεσιν ιδί­
αν άπηνέγκατο, ούκ άναμείνας τήν έξ ένεστώτος γενομένην σύνθεσιν.
You shouldn’t imagine that past-tense compound forms are inflected from pres­
ent compounds, but realize rather that each tense is separately made by com­
pounding from the simplex tense. So just as katagrapho is made from graphô, 
so kategrapsa is made by compounding from egrapsa [and not by inflection 
from katagrapho). [...] The best proof of this is probably the fact that compound 
aorists (and perfects) exist without corresponding presents, and also futures and 
presents without corresponding aorists (or perfects). But if it was proper for all 
compounds to start with presents and then derive aorists (and prefects) from 
them, there couldn’t properly be any compound aorist (or perfect) without a cor­
responding compound present. We say katephagon (‘I devoured’, kata + ephagon 
‘I ate’, aorist) although there is no suggestion of a corresponding present [from 
the same stem], and katoisô (Ί will bring down’ from kata + oisô ‘I will bring’) 
although there is no present or aorist either in use from this stem. And besides 
that, there is a present apeimi (‘I am absent’) without any obvious corresponding 
aorist (or perfect). So we must agree that each tense-system accepts composition 
independently, since not every verb is usable in every different tense system, and 
so [non-presents] must be independently compounded, without waiting for an 
initial compounding of the present.
As can be seen, Apollonius based his argument on the relative formal independence 
of temporal(-aspectual) formations of a verb in the Greek language by making refer­
ence to examples of verbs whose paradigms are suppletive. Thus he restricted verbal 
inflexion to the formal variance within a given, individual temporal-aspectual value, 
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which enabled him to demonstrate the lack of changes at the boundary between 
the prothesis and the verbal component and to defend his thesis about the synthetic 
nature of such structures. Moreover, this restricted understanding of inflexion 
does not make irrelevant the aforementioned distributive criterion, for within the 
limits of such a narrowly defined paradigm the connectibility of the prothesis with 
a verbal component remains unrestricted (κατέγραψα, κατέγραψας, κατέγραψε, etc.), 
in a similar way as the distribution of the prothesis in its synthetic combination 
with a nominal component remains unlimited within the framework of declen­
sional inflexion (σύνοικος, συνοίκου, συνοικώ, etc.).
Ihe third type of criterion to which Apollonius refers in order to distinguish 
synthetic structures (i.e. compounds) from parathetical structures (i.e. phrases), 
is - as we have mentioned before - morphological and syntactic in nature. To be 
more precise, it is based on the linear order of components of the structure in cases 
when the structure is accompanied by an article. Apollonius writes the following:
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 4,13:
Αλλά μήν έτι κάκ τής τού άρθρου παραθέσεως. πρωτευούση γάρ τή προθέσει 
κατά παράθεσιν παραχωρεί τής προθέσεως, μετιόν έφ’ δ συνήρτηται· ού μήν ήν 
σύνθεσις ή, εϊγε μέρος ονόματος γενομένη εξει προκείμενον τό καλούμενον προ­
τακτικόν άρθρον τών ονομάτων, τού μέν προτέρου περί Αριστάρχου - περί τού 
Αριστάρχου, κατά Κτησιφώντος - κατά τού Κτησιφώντος, περί στεφάνου - περί 
τού στεφάνου, τού δέ δευτέρου ό περικλυτός, ό σύνδουλος, ό μέτοικος.
We can also judge by inserting the definite article. When the article is added, 
it yields first position to the preposition if the construction is a phrase, and 
follows that on which it depends. But if the expression is a compound, this does 
not happen, since the preposition here is a part of the [compound] noun and 
so will have before it the so-called prepositive article. Examples of the phrase: 
peri Aristarchou - peri tou Aristarchou (‘about Aristarchus’; addition of the arti­
cle makes no translatable difference), kata Ktesiphontos - kata tou Ktesiphontos 
(‘against Ctesiphon’), peri stephanou - peri tou stephanou (‘on crown’). Examples 
of the compound case: ho periklutos (‘the renowned man’; never 'peri ho klutos), 
ho sundoulos (‘the fellow-slave’), ho metoikos (‘the resident alien’).
We may therefore state that, on the one hand, since it is based on the way a given 
structure combines with the article, this criterion is syntactic in nature, and on 
the other, given that its essence involves linear (dis)continuity of the structure, i.e. 
its (in)divisibility into segments which may be separated by an additional element 
(i.e. the article), it takes on also a morphological character. It is worthwhile to 
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add that in the further part of the above quoted paragraph Apollonius also draws 
attention to the fact that some of the structures discussed by him may be ambivalent 
as far as their status as a compound or a phrase is concerned, i.e. they may accept 
both a preposed article and one located between the two components. However, 
at the same time he notices that this ambivalence involves also a certain semantic 
ambiguity and that the latter can be resolved by the insertion of the article, what 
resolves at the same time the question of the synthetic or parathetical status of 
a given structure. The grammarian writes the following:
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 4,13:
"Ενεκα τού τοιούτου και τα ύπ’ αμφιβολίαν πίπτοντα εκλύεται τού αμφιβόλου 
προσλαβόντα τά άρθρα· διοίσει γάρ τό παρά τού νόμου, παρά τού φέροντος 
τών τοιούτων τού παραφέροντος, τού παρανόμου.
Because of this, even potentially ambiguous sequences may have their ambiguity 
resolved by the insertion of the article. So there will be a distinction between 
para tou nomou (‘from beside the law (inscribed on a stone stele)’) or para tou 
pherontos (‘from the one bringing’) etc. and touparapherontos (‘of the one serving’) 
and tou paranomou (‘of the illegality’).
Therefore, as a matter of fact, in such cases it is the meaning, emphasised by the 
addition of the article, that determines the (synthetic or parathetical) status of 
a given structure.
Meaning also constitutes an important factor in the criterion which the gram­
marian in question applied in the interpretation of the status of the causal con­
junction διότι (dioti) ‘because’. Assuming that the first component of this structure 
is the prothesis διά (dia), he inquired whether διότι as a whole is a parathetical or 
a synthetic structure and whether the second component of this structure is the 
indeclinable conjunction on (hoti), or a declinable word. His answer is that it is 
a parathetical combination of διά with a declinable word and he substantiated 
his argument in the following way:
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 4, 29:
Αλλά καί τά παρεπόμενα συνομολογεί· πρώτον [...] τό τήν διά μηδέποτε έν 
συνθέσει αίτιολογικώς παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ώς έν τφ διάδρομος ή διατρέχω, έν δέ 
παραθέσει πτώσεως αιτιατικής, διάΤρύφωνα, διά τήν ήμέραν. καί έντεύθεν όμο- 
λογεΐται ώς ούδέ τό δτι σύνδεσμός έστιν, άλλά πτωτικόν μόριον τής αιτιατικής 
πτώσεως, ε’ίγε έδείχθη ότι ούδέ έν παραθέσει έστιν ή εύθεϊα τών προθέσεων καί 
ώς έν εύθείφε ή διά συνδεσμικήν ούκ έπέχει σύνταξιν.
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But [this analysis] is confirmed by the properties [of did]. In the first place, dia 
never has the causal sense in compounds, e.g. diadromos (‘passage’) or diatrecho 
(‘I run across’), but only in phrases with the accusative case, dia Truphóna (‘because 
of Tryphon’), dia ten hemeran (‘because of the day’). And so it is also clear that 
the hoti [in dihoti] cannot be the conjunction hoti (‘because’), but must be a nom­
inal in the accusative case, since we have already shown that the nominative is 
never governed by a preposition and that when there is a compound of dia in 
the nominative, the dia can’t have the conjunctional use.24
24 Which should be understood that it cannot have a causal meaning.
25 See also Bednarski (1994: 29).
So, according to Apollonius the causal meaning of the structure as a whole deter­
mines the meaning which the component διά assumes within it and this, in turn, 
determines the prepositional (and not prefixal) status of this component and the 
parathetical nature of relations which link it with the second component of the 
structure (i.e. on) and finally the specific grammatical properties of this second 
component (i.e. the fact that it occurs in the accusative).25 In the subsequent 
paragraph the grammarian considers the essence of this declinable (πτωτικόν, ptó- 
tikon) on which occurs in the accusative and states that it is not a single word but 
a parathetical combination of the pronouns o (ho) and n (ti) in the neuter gender, 
to which δς τις (hos tis) ‘who(ever)’ corresponds in the masculine gender in the 
nominative. Therefore, at the end he presents the following conclusion:
Apollonii Dyscoli De constructione 4, 30:
Προφανές γενήσεται ώς ε’ίη έν τρισ'ι μέρεσι λόγου, προθέσεως τής διά κατά 
συνδεσμικήν σύνταξιν φερομένης έπ’ αιτιατικήν καί παραλλήλων δύο πτωτικών, 
τού δ καί τού τί, πτώσεως δντων ούκ άλλης ή αιτιατικής.
So it’s clear that [dihoti] consists of three words, first preposition dia in its causal 
sense which governs the accusative, and then two parallel (i.e. appositional) nom­
inale, ho (‘which’) and ti (‘something’), in what can only be the accusative case.
One must admit that Apollonius’ sophisticated line of reasoning about the con­
junction διότι is consistent with the argumentation that he used in his discussion 
of other structures of a (potentially) doubtful grammatical status. On the other 
hand, it should be pointed out that the causal sense of the preposition <5icrin a con­
struction with nominal forms in the accusative, and therefore the basic argument 
which is supposed to support the parathetical nature of the conjunction διότι, 
Ancient Greeks on compounds ... 843
implies the casual nature of the content expressed by these nominal forms in the 
accusative, and that, of course, is not included in the grammaticalised semantics 
of this conjunction. However, in general the rules propounded by Apollonius for 
the classification of linguistic structures, that is for distinguishing words from 
phrases, without doubt deserve to be appreciated due to their ground-breaking 
nature and the application of exclusively intralinguistic criteria. A greater amount 
of precision in this respect was not achieved certainly due to the lack of aware­
ness of the difference between words as textual units and words as grammatical 
and lexical units. However, it would be unfair to blame a grammarian who lived 
in 2nd century ad for ignorance in this respect, especially considering the fact 
that we owe his scholarly curiosity, intelligence and analytical sense an excellent 
initial contribution to the on-going discussion about the concept and definition 
of the word in linguistics.
Summing up the entire overview of texts which is presented above one should 
say that it demonstrates above all the fact that in the Greek reflection about language 
the analysis of the compoundhood of words was multifaceted and was conducted 
from many perspectives. For Aristotle the basic problem was associated with 
the statement if and in what way the compoundhood of nouns influenced their 
functional semantics, perceived mainly according to logical criteria. The Tekhne 
grammatike attributed to Dionysius Ihrax presents compoundhood from the point of 
view of its status as one of the grammatical properties of words and its relationship 
with the remaining properties which constitute the grammatical characteristics 
of words, especially with the inflexional ones. Finally, Apollonius Dyscolus made 
an attempt at indicating the criteria which would enable him to distinguish com­
poundhood from the syntactic complexity, and this, in turn, involved the necessity 
of establishing the basic definitional properties of the word. Thus compoundhood 
marked its presence in Greek linguistics as a phenomenon which was analysed 
from the perspective of semantics, morphology and syntax.
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